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This paper quantifies market sentiment as four indexes and examines whether they can help predict 
stock prices in Japanese markets. Sentiment analysis is gaining increasing interest in both academia 
and business. Previously, Ishijima et al. (2014) created a sentiment index that quantifies the positive 
or negative emotions that might appear in the Nikkei, which is the most popular business newspaper 
in Japan. They concluded that the sentiment index significantly predicts stock prices three days in 
advance. We re-examine their recent 5-year-worth results by extending in two dimensions; that is, 
we extend the coverage of the Nikkei to 29 years and create variations of their original sentiment 
index. 
 On the basis of 29-year-worth daily sentiment indexes, we thoroughly examine the 
predictability of Japanese stock prices. The findings of our year-by-year analysis are two-fold: (1) 
sentiment indexes created from all of Nikkei’s articles persistently predict the Nikkei 225 stock prices, 
in both in-sample and out-of-sample bases, and (2) these periods can be interpreted using business 
cycles defined by Japan’s Cabinet Office. 
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Sentiment analysis is gaining increasing interest in both academia and business. As sentiment 
invisibly reflects the atmosphere of economic activities and the psychology of economic agents, 
analyzing sentiment helps us understand the economy and security markets in a more sophisticated 
manner. 
 As a background to market sentiment analysis, we briefly outline the literature. Recent attention 
to market sentiment stems from a question cast upon market rationality. According to the theory of 
efficient markets, information spreads quite efficiently throughout global markets; thus, no one can 
obtain excess return on investment above that rationally expected from its relevant risk (Fama, 1965, 
1991). Although many empirical studies have supported this hypothesis, a growing number of 
studies attempt to demonstrate the opposite. In fact, such studies seek evidence of the opportunity for 
excess returns and reveal the predictability of stock prices. 
 Some theories attempt to support econometric analysis for evidence of market anomalies. In 
particular, behavioral economics, pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), developed the 
foundation for economic agent behavior by focusing on its psychological aspect. Ritter (2003) 
offered a brief but very clear summary of the behavioral finance literature regarding cognitive 
psychology and its limits to arbitrage. A typical analysis is that market participants do not always 
trade rationally. Instead, they trade irrationally and in accordance with their prevailing psychological 
state, which presents an opportunity to gain excess returns. Other theories proposed that economic 
agents are sometimes influenced by information that is irrelevant to economic circumstances, 
including social atmosphere, public opinion, and social trends. “Sentiment” is a word that reflects 
these perceptions of information; however, it has been considered insubstantial. 
 Sentiment analysis is a recent movement that attempts to make sentiment definable and 
measurable. Recent advances in text mining technology make this goal feasible by building useful 
indices that precisely reflect sentiment. Having been supported by contests against the rationality 
assumption and by the theory of behavioral economics, sentiment analysis is gaining attention in the 
fields of social and economic analysis. 
 Among the growing literature on sentiment analysis, the following studies are worth 
mentioning because they refer to stock prices. Tetlock (2007) investigated the interaction between 
the media and the stock market; in a subsequent work, Tetlock et al. (2008) examined whether a 
quantitative measure of language can help predict individual firms’ accounting earnings and stock 
returns. Bollen et al. (2011) suggested several types of sentiment indexes (SIs) based on Twitter, and 
Boudoukh et al. (2012) examined how news sentiment drives stock price movements. 
 Interesting examples of sentiment analysis in a general context, not necessarily related to stock 
markets, include the following. Gruhl et al. (2005) studied the relationship between online chat and 
book sales. Mishne and Glance (2006) investigated the sales of film distributors as influenced by 
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critics’ blogs, whereas Asur and Huberman (2010) studied similar effects based on Twitter. Liu et al. 
(2007) developed the “probabilistic latent semantic analysis” (PLSA) model to extract SIs from 
blogs and suggested its use for sales prediction. Choi and Varian (2009) studied the role of Google 
searches in investigating relationships between several consumer-related indices and the rate of 
disease infection. Schumaker and Chen (2009) found direct causality between spot financial news 
announcements and stock price responses. Asur and Huberman (2010) did a similar study, focusing 
on Twitter. 
 
With this background, Ishijima et al. (2014) analyzed the sentiment for the Japanese economy 
that appears in daily news articles. In fact, they created a word frequency index that accounts for 
words that affirmatively or negatively describe the current economic situation. News articles were 
taken from the Nikkei, a popular business newspaper in Japan. They then performed a statistical 
analysis to examine the interaction between the SI and the Nikkei 225 stock prices. Interestingly, 
they concluded that the index significantly predicts stock prices three days in advance. 
 The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the analysis of Ishijima et al. (2014) and provide a 
more comprehensive analysis of Japanese economic sentiment as it appears in the Nikkei. To this end, 
we extend their analysis in two dimensions: one is to extend the coverage of the Nikkei to 29 years 
and the other is to create variations of the original SI. 
 
(1) Data that covers a 29-year-horizon: 
Ishijima et al. (2014) covered only the recent five year period, from January 2007 to September 2012. 
In contrast, we work on a much longer sample period of 29 years that spreads from March 1984 to 
September 2012. For each year, we examine the predictability of stock prices by our SIs. 
 
(2) Variations of SI: 
We reconsider the methodology of creating an index and propose four new indexes: 
 
Scoring process 
We quantify the market sentiment along a one-dimensional semantic axis, from negative to positive 
feelings. For every single word that appears in the Nikkei, we match it to the prescribed semantic 
dictionary developed by Takamura (2007). For every match, we record a score paired with the word 
that represents its extent of association with the negative feeling of the Japanese people. In this 
scoring process, there are two criteria of measurement: how to score each matched word and to what 






The semantic dictionary (Takamura, 2007) provides a list of words that are scored from −1 to 1. The 
closer the score comes to −1, the more negative the feelings that people associate with that word, and 
vice versa. We then exploit the score in one of two ways: using the raw score or rounding to the 
nearest integer score that is either 1 or −1. We call the former scoring “real-valued” and the latter 
“integer-valued.” In the latter case, we round to −1 if the raw score ranges between −1 and 0, and 
otherwise 1. 
 
Coverage of source in the Nikkei 
We then sum these scores over the following two sources: headlines only or the entire article text. 
We call the former coverage “Headlines Only” and the latter “Entire Article.” As the position of the 
word in the Nikkei might affect the reader’s sentiment, these two coverage profiles in scoring help us 
understand the importance of the sentiment exhibited either in headlines alone or in the entire set of 
article texts for predicting stock prices.  
 Using the above methodology, we obtain two types of scoring methods for the two Nikkei 
coverage profiles. This results in four ways to create the SIs. In contrast, Ishijima et al. (2014) only 
created and examined one of four SIs, which is the integer-valued SI created from the entire article 
text in our study. 
 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on how to create market SIs. 
Section 3 develops the analytical models. Section 4 implements an empirical analysis of the 




(1) Prerequisite text processing steps 
The Nikkei is published in Japanese; due to a unique feature of the Japanese language, 
text-processing steps are a prerequisite before applying the normal text mining technique. As words 
are not separated with spaces in Japanese texts, we first inserted spaces to separate words. This step 
has become feasible only with recent advances in Japanese text mining technologies. We used 
MeCab 0.996,1 an application equipped with the ability to select nouns, adjectives, and verbs and to 
remove punctuation marks and other unnecessary characters and elements. 
 
                                                        
1 MeCab 0.996 is an application for conducting morphological analysis developed by the Graduate 
School of Informatics, Kyoto University and NTT Communication Science Laboratories in 2013. For 
details, see http://mecab.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/mecab/doc/index.html (accessed 30 August 2014). 
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(2) Source: selection based on word position 
Every page in the newspaper comprises pairs of headlines and articles. The position of the word 
(either in the headline or article text) might affect the impact on a reader’s positive or negative 
invoked sentiment around that word. In this aspect, we strictly distinguish the words in articles from 
the words in headlines and clarify this by introducing specific notations. 
 In the newspaper delivered at day ݐ, we have ݊௧ headlines and articles. Each headline and 
article are denoted by ܪ௜,௧ and ܣ௜,௧	ሺ݅ ൌ 1,⋯ , ݊௧ሻ. Each headline and article have ݊௜,௧ሺுሻ and ݊௜,௧ሺ஺ሻ 
words, respectively. The words in headline ܪ௜,௧  and article ܣ௜,௧  are denoted by ௜ܹ௝,௧ሺுሻ 	ቀ݆ ൌ
1,⋯ , ݊௜,௧ሺுሻቁ and ௜ܹ௠,௧ሺ஺ሻ 	ቀ݉ ൌ 1,⋯ , ݊௜,௧ሺ஺ሻቁ, respectively. 
 At this point, we introduce aggregate notation to represent whether the word selected is 
headline or article text. This enables later discussion on how to quantify the sentiment. The choice of 
word position is limited to either headlines or articles, and is denoted by ࣡ ≔ ሼܪ, ܣሽ. We simply call 
࣡ the “source.” We then let ܩ ∈ ࣡ to show either headline ܪ or article ܣ. Then, in the newspaper 
delivered at day ݐ, ௜ܹ௝,௧ሺீሻ denotes the ݆th word ቀ݆ ൌ 1,⋯ , ݊௜,௧ሺீሻቁ that comprises the ݅th source 
ܩ௜,௧	ሺ݅ ൌ 1,⋯ , ݊௧ሻ. 
 
(3) Semantic dictionary 
The semantic dictionary used in our analysis, the Tango Kanjyo Kyokusei Taiou Hyou (Semantic 
Orientations Dictionary) was developed by Takamura (2007). The dictionary is denoted by 
ࣞ ≔ ൛൫ܦ௞, ܵሺܦ௞ሻ൯ห݇ ൌ 1⋯ܭൟ. The dictionary comprises pairs of word ܦ௞ and their semantic 
scores ܵሺܦ௞ሻ, which range from −1 to +1. Regarding the semantic score, the closer to −1 (or +1) the 
score becomes, the more negative (or positive) feeling the word invokes for the Japanese people. As 
a reference, the number of words that invoke positive feelings, i.e., those with positive scores 
ܵሺܦ௞ሻ ൐ 0, is 5,122. Conversely, the number of words that induce negative feelings (scores) is 
49,983. As these negative words number some ten times that of positive words, we might say that the 
Japanese language is rich in expressing negative feelings. This is, however, not unique to Japanese; 
for example, the English semantic dictionary, developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011), and 
optimally tuned for both finance and accounting fields, has 2,337 negative words and 353 positive 
words. Hence, we should treat this bias carefully in the analysis. 
 
(4) Semantic index: two methods to quantify positive or negative feelings 
We define an indicator function to identify a word match with the dictionary: 
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 ܫ௜௝,௧ሺீሻሺ݇ሻ ≔ ቊ1 ቀif ௜ܹ௝,௧
ሺீሻ matches ܦ௞ቁ
0 ሺotherwiseሻ . (1)  
To score the positive or negative feelings, we introduce two methods for deriving SIs. 
(a) Real-valued SI 
 The first method uses the semantic score ܵ௞ ൌ ܵሺܦ௞ሻ assigned to the listed word ܦ௞. We 
define an index created in this first way as the “real-valued SI.” 
 ݔ௧ሺீ,ோሻ ≔ ∑ ∑ ∑ ܫ௜௝,௧ሺீሻሺ݇ሻ ⋅ ܵ௞௄௞ୀଵ
௡೔,೟ሺಸሻ
௝ୀଵ
௡೟௜ୀଵ . (2)  
For source ܩ ൌ ܪ, the coverage is limited to headline words and the real-valued SI is given by 
ݔ௧ሺீ,ோሻ ൌ ݔ௧ሺு,ோሻ . Similarly, for the source of ܩ ൌ ܣ  (articles), the real-valued SI is given by 
ݔ௧ሺீ,ோሻ ൌ ݔ௧ሺ஺,ோሻ. 
(b) Integer-valued SI 
 The second method rounds the semantic score ܵ௞ to the nearest binary integer: either −1 or +1. 
Introducing the integer variable for each semantic score, we obtain 
 ܬ௞ ≔ ൜൅1 ሺif 0 ൏ ܵ௞ ൑ 1ሻെ1 ሺif െ 1 ൑ ܵ௞ ൑ 0ሻ. (3)  
We then define an index created in the second manner as an “integer-valued SI.” 
 ݔ௧ሺீ,ூሻ ≔ ∑ ∑ ∑ ܫ௜௝,௧ሺீሻሺ݇ሻ ⋅ ܬ௞௄௞ୀଵ
௡೔,೟ሺಸሻ
௝ୀଵ
௡೟௜ୀଵ . (4)  
Recalling that each of the two SIs has an option in picking the source, either headlines ሺܩ ൌ ܪሻ or 
entire set of articles ሺܩ ൌ ܣሻ, we have four types of SI in the analysis. 




ۖۓݔሺு,ூሻ ሺinteger െ valued headline s. i. ሻ
ݔሺு,ோሻ ሺreal െ valued	headline	s. i. ሻ
ݔሺ஺,ூሻ ሺinteger െ valued article s. i. ሻ
ݔሺ஺,ோሻ ሺreal െ valued article s. i. ሻ
, (5)  
where ܩ denotes one of the sources (ܪ or ܣ) and # denotes the scoring method (integer-valued 
“ܫ” scoring or real-valued “ܴ” scoring). 
 Following the procedures described above, we created a 29-year daily time-series of four SIs, 
based on headlines and articles from the Nikkei. We remark that these SIs are normalized so that they 
have zero means and unit standard deviations. 
 
2.2. Data description and summary statistics of the SI 
In creating these SIs, we used 7,188 daily issues of the Nikkei published during 343 months from 
March 1984 to September 2012 (archives supplied by Nikkei Digital Media, Inc.). For Japanese 
stock prices, we used the daily closing prices of the Nikkei 225 converted into log-returns. The 
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Nikkei is published daily and delivered with a few no-issue days, but the Japanese stock market is 
closed every weekend. To handle this incongruence in the daily data set, which creates an 
inconsistency in frequency, we follow the approach of Bollen et al. (2011), by eliminating every 
Saturday and Sunday from the complete data set prior to implementing the analysis. Hence we 
obtain data for about 21 days per month, on average. 
Basic data about the Nikkei is summarized in Table 1 and Table 2. The total number of 
headlines—or, equivalently, that of articles—is 4,747,942. Among headlines and entire articles, the 
numbers of words matched to the semantic dictionary are 11,919,412 and 134,337,485, respectively. 
Using these matched words in the Nikkei, we created four types of daily SIs on the basis of the 
procedures already described. Table 1 and Table 2 show the summary statistics of headline and 
article SIs, respectively. 
 
2.3. Preliminary insights 
In this study, we are interested in exploring whether our SIs can help predict stock prices. Before 
implementing a rigorous analysis, we describe Figure 1 through Figure 4, which exhibit time-series 
of the stock log-returns and real-valued article SI around historical events that might affect the 
Japanese economy. These include the Plaza Accord in 1985 (Figure 1), highest peak of the Nikkei 
225 in 1989 (Figure 2), climax of the Internet Bubble in 2000 (Figure 3), and the Great East Japan 
Earthquake in 2011 (Figure 4).  
From these figures, stock prices and SIs seem to co-vary in the same direction around these 
historical events. Here we remark that the SIs are plotted five or six days in advance. Hence, these 
snapshots show a possibility that market sentiment leads stock prices in the Japanese stock market. 
We then proceed to model these insights and conduct a plausible empirical analysis, which is 
presented in the following sections. 
 
3 Model 
To explore whether our SIs can predict stock prices, we employ the vector auto-regression (VAR) 
model, which is conventionally used in econometrics literature. In our VAR modeling, stock 
log-returns are denoted by ݕ ൌ ሼݕ௧: ݐ ൌ 1,⋯ , ܶሽ and the four types of SI are denoted by ݔሺீ,#ሻ ൌ
ቄݔ௧ሺீ,#ሻ: ݐ ൌ 1,⋯ , ܶቅ, where ܩ  denotes one of the sources, either ܪ  (headlines) or ܣ  (entire 
articles), and #  denotes the scoring method, which is either integer-valued “ܫ ” scoring or 
real-valued “ܴ” scoring. 
 For each of the two scoring methods, we estimate three VAR(p) models comprising 
independent variables of (H) headline SI, (A) article SI, or both (H&A) headline and article SIs, 
respectively. Thus, each of the three VAR(p) models is specified as follows: 
8 
 
Model (H) ݕ௧ ൌ ∑ ߙ௜ݕ௧ି௜ ൅ ߚ௜ݔ௧ି௜ሺு,ோ ௢௥ ூሻ௣௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧, (6)  
Model (A) ݕ௧ ൌ ∑ ߙ௜ݕ௧ି௜ ൅ ߛ௜ݔ௧ି௜ሺ஺,ோ ௢௥ ூሻ௣௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧, (7)  
Model (H&A) ݕ௧ ൌ ∑ ߙ௜ݕ௧ି௜ ൅ ߚ௜ݔ௧ି௜ሺு,ோ ௢௥ ூሻ ൅ ߛ௜ݔ௧ି௜ሺ஺,ோ ௢௥ ூሻ௣௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧, (8)  
where ݌ denotes the number of lags.  
 Within these VAR(p) model specifications, the Granger causality can be stated as follows: if 
the SIs (ݔሺீ,#ሻ) Granger-cause (G-cause) stock log-returns (ݕ), then the past SIs should help predict 
stock log-returns, beyond the prediction by past stock log-returns alone. Using these three VAR(p) 
models, we implement three Granger causality tests (G-tests) as follows: 
(1) “G-test for Model (H)” tests whether the headline SI G-causes stock log-returns by exploiting 
Equation (6). The null hypothesis is ߚ௜ ൌ 0	ሺ݅ ൌ 1⋯݌ሻ.  
(2) “G-test for Model (A)” tests whether the entire article SI G-causes stock log-returns by exploiting 
Equation (7). The null hypothesis is ߛ௜ ൌ 0	ሺ݅ ൌ 1⋯݌ሻ.  
(3-1) “G-test 1 for Model (H&A)” tests whether the headline SI G-causes stock log-returns by 
exploiting Equation (8). The null hypothesis is ߚ௜ ൌ 0	ሺ݅ ൌ 1⋯݌ሻ. 
(3-2) “G-test 2 for Model (H&A)” tests whether the entire article SI G-causes stock log-returns by 
exploiting Equation (8). The null hypothesis is ߛ௜ ൌ 0	ሺ݅ ൌ 1⋯݌ሻ. 
 
4 Empirical Analysis in the Japanese Stock Market 
In terms of Granger causality tests, we explore whether the four SIs can predict Japanese stock 
prices for each year from 1984 to 2012. More specifically, our interests lie in finding (i) the SIs for 
which the VAR model provides the best goodness-of-fit in terms of AICs, and (ii) whether the 
best-fitted VAR model persistently predicts Japanese stock prices over 29 years. 
 
(1) Unit root tests 
Before estimating the VAR models Eqs. (6)‒(8), we implemented augmented Dickey–Fuller tests. 
These results are shown in Table 3. For each year, we verified that all the time-series of stock 
log-returns, headline, and article SIs do not have a unit root with 1% significance. 
 We then proceed to estimate VAR models and implement Granger tests. As seen in Table 1 and 
Table 2, our SIs are rather negatively skewed and might contain sample biases. Hence, we employ 
robust covariance-matrix estimators in conducting the Granger causality tests to consider 
heteroskedasticity due to such possible sample biases. 
 Table 4 and Table 5 show the results of Granger causality tests with real- and integer-valued SIs, 
respectively. For each year, Models (H), (A), and (H&A) or relevant Eqs. (6), (7), and (8), are 
estimated and tested. For each estimation, we search the lag ݌ from 1 to 7 to identify the best ݌ in 
terms of AICs; for those models with the best ݌, the relevant test statistics (“Granger”-labeled 





 For both the real- and integer-valued cases shown in Table 4 and Table 5, Model (H&A) fits 
best in terms of AICs throughout the 29 years. When comparing the real- and integer-valued cases, 
the former performs better in the aspects of AICs. Hence, in the following discussion, we will mainly 
focus on the results for estimating Model (H&A) on the basis of real-valued SI. 
 
(3) Predictability of stock prices 
 From the right-most panel in Table 4, Model (H&A) of Eq. (8) persistently shows the 
predictability of stock prices on the basis of a real-valued SI. More specifically, the article index 
persistently and significantly Granger-causes stock log-returns in conjunction with the headline 
index (“Granger A” column in that right-most panel). In addition, the headline index Granger-causes 
stock log-returns in conjunction with the article index (“Granger H” column in the same panel). 
Conversely, Models (H) and (A) of Eqs. (6) and (7) do not seem to provide persistent Granger 
causalities. These results imply that it is important for our VAR modeling to incorporate both 
headline and article SIs to predict stock prices and that it is insufficient to separately introduce either 
headline or article SIs. 
 It should be noted that the Granger causality seems to be weakened during some periods. 
During the period from 2001 to 2004 that was right after the burst of the Internet Bubble, and in 
1987 that brought Black Monday, the Japanese economy had experienced a downturn. In those 
periods, the article index seems to have stronger Granger causality than the headline index. 
 
(4) Significant lagged variables 
 Table 6 exhibits the year-by-year estimates of Model (H&A), represented by Eq. (8), on the 
basis of a real-valued SI. Interestingly enough, we found nine cyclical patterns in our estimation 
results. 
(i) Cycle 1 was significant 
Cycle 1 is defined as the period from 1984 to 1985. Cycle 1 was uphill two years toward the peak of 
Japan’s 10th business cycle, as defined by Japan’s Cabinet Office. In this Cycle, two SIs with shorter 
lags of 1 and 2 and a long lag of 6 serve as significant variables. 
 
(ii) Cycle 2 was not significant 
Cycle 2 is defined as the period from 1986 to 1987, around the bottom that defined the beginning of 
the 11th business cycle. In this Cycle, we could not find any significant lagged variables on either 




(iii) Cycle 3 was significant 
Cycle 3 is defined as the period from 1988 to 1992, around the peak of the 11th business cycle. In 
this Cycle, two SIs with short lag 1, middle lag 3, and long lag 5 serve as significant variables. 
 
(iv) Cycle 4 was not significant 
Cycle 4 is defined as a longer six year period from 1993 to 1998, which corresponds to the 12th 
business cycle. Cycle 4 also covers the first half of the “Lost Ten Years” in which Japan experienced 
long-term economic stagnation. In Cycle 4, we could not find any significant lagged variables in the 
SIs. 
 
(v) Cycle 5 was significant 
Cycle 5 is defined as the period from 1999 to 2000, which was uphill two years toward the peak of 
the 13th business cycle and which is often referred to as the “Internet Bubble.” In this Cycle, two SIs 
with short lag 1 and middle lags 3 and 4 were significant. 
 
(vi) Cycle 6 was not significant 
Cycle 6 is defined as the period from 2001 to 2005, around the bottom that defines the end of the 
13th business cycle and the beginning of the 14th business cycle. Cycle 6 follows the “Japanese Big 
Bang,” which refers to the financial system reforms conducted from 1996 to 2001. The Bank of 
Japan also adopted a zero-interest rate policy during this cycle. Although real GDP growth marked 
about 2% per year on average, Japan was still suffering from the “Lost Twenty Years” since the early 
1990s. In this Cycle, we could not find any significant lagged variables on SIs. 
 
(vii) Cycle 7 was significant 
Cycle 7 is defined as the period from 2006 to 2007 that brought the 2008 financial crisis and was 
uphill two years toward the peak of the 14th business cycle. In this Cycle, two SIs, with short lag 1 
and middle lags of 3 and 4, were significant variables. 
 
(viii) Cycle 8 was not significant 
Cycle 8 is defined as three years from 2008 to 2010. Cycle 8 includes and follows the 2008 financial 
crisis. It is spread around the end of the 14th business cycle and beginning of the 15th business cycle. 
In this Cycle, we could not find any significant lagged variables on SIs. 
 
(ix) Cycle 9 was significant 
Cycle 9 is defined as the period from 2011 to 2012. Although Japan suffered from the earthquake on 
March 11, 2011, it had been uphill two years toward the peak of the 15th business cycle. In this Cycle, 
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two SIs with shorter lags 1 and 2 serve as significant variables. 
 
(5) Comparisons with other relevant work 
 Ishijima et al. (2014) reported that following the 2008 financial crisis, the integer-valued article 
SI significantly predicts stock prices three days in advance. This can be found in Table 5 (middle 
panel, titled “Article Eq. (7)”). Indeed, we can see significant Granger causalities around 2008. 
Unfortunately, this finding does not seem to be persistent when we review this from 
29-year-horizontal results that we have shown in this paper. 
 
(6) Out-of-sample predictability 
On an in-sample basis, the Granger causality tests provided evidence that our SIs can help predict 
Japanese stock prices. Furthermore, we will address the question of out-of-sample predictability of 
stock prices using these indexes by elaborating on the empirical analysis design. 
We divide each year in half, from 1984 to 2012. For each half year, tracking periods are set, 
followed by estimation periods. More specifically, we set appropriate periods for tracking the 
out-of-sample predictability performance of Model (H&A), as represented by Eq. (8). This tracking 
period is denoted ࣯, and ܯ is the number of days in ࣯. At time ݑ ∈ ࣯, we estimate Model 
(H&A) using the expanding window over two time-series for log-returns of the Nikkei 225 and 
market SIs, which are denoted by datasets ሼݕ௧; ݕ௧ି௜, ݔ௧ି௜		ሺ݅ ൌ 1,⋯ , ݌; ݐ ൌ ݌ ൅ 1,⋯ , ݑሻሽ. We then 
evaluate the out-of-sample predictability performance via the following three steps: 
Step 1: Estimate models 
At time ݑ ∈ ࣯, we estimate Model (H&A) over the expanding window to obtain the 
estimated parameters: ൛ߙො, ߚመ௜, ߛො௜		ሺ݅ ൌ 1,⋯ , ݌ሻൟ. 
Step 2: Predict out‐of‐sample rate of return 
We then predict the out-of-sample log-return of the Nikkei 225 on the next day ݑ ൅ 1. 
Using estimated parameters, the predicted log-return is given by  
 ݕො௨ାଵ ൌ ∑ ߙො௜ݕ௨ାଵି௜ ൅ ߚመ௜ݔ௨ାଵି௜ሺு,ோሻ ൅ ߛො௜ݔ௨ାଵି௜ሺ஺,ோሻ௣௜ୀଵ . (9)  
Step 3: Measure out‐of‐sample performance 
We evaluate the out-of-sample performance by two measures. The first measure is the 
prediction error. By defining ߝ௨ାଵ ≔ ݕ௨ାଵ െ ݕො௨ାଵ, we measure the prediction error as its 
standard deviation through tracking period ࣯. This is given by ඥ∑ ሺߝ௨ାଵ െ ߝ	ഥሻଶ௨∈࣯ ܯ⁄ . 
As the second measure, if the sign of the realized rate of return ݕ௨ାଵ is the same as 
that of its prediction ݕො௨ାଵ, then we state that the model at least predicts the direction of 
stock price movement. We refer to this prediction measure as the winner. We introduce an 
indicator function to count the number of winners: ߡ௨ାଵ ൌ 1	ሺif	ݕ௨ାଵ ⋅ ݕො௨ାଵ ൐ 0ሻ and 




By varying the tracking periods, we report the out-of-sample predictability for each year in 
Table 7 on a prediction error basis and in Table 8 on a winner basis. 
As shown in Table 7, in terms of average prediction errors for every five years, the shortest 
10-day tracking period provides the best predictability in every first half of the year: except in the 
2000s, the average prediction error is below 30%. In the second half of the year, 10-day or 20-day 
tracking periods provide the best predictability, but with an error rate above 30%. Hence, on an 
out-of-sample basis, the market SI might be able to predict Japanese stock prices better in every first 
half of the year using the shortest tracking periods. Predictability also deteriorates as the tracking 
period becomes longer; possibly, because as the tracking period is extended, the Japanese stock 
market tends to change its structure, as implied by VAR estimation from the past data set. 
 As shown in Table 8, in the aspects of winners for every five years, the 10-day tracking period 
again provides the best predictability in every first half of the year. Moreover, the average winner 
marks between 57% and 70%, except during the 2000s, whereas in the second half of the year, the 
average winner deteriorates as opposed to the first half of the year, except the first five years of the 
1990s. 
 As a summary of out-of-sample predictability, we conclude that the market SI can help predict 
Japanese stock prices in every first half of the year, using the 10-day tracking period. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 We created a 29-year daily time-series of four SIs that reflect the positive or negative feelings 
represented in articles in the Nikkei. The analysis is based on Ishijima et al. (2014), using a 
sophisticated version of their analysis. We showed that (1) SIs created from the Nikkei’s entire 
articles persistently predict the Nikkei 225 stock prices on both in-sample and out-of-sample bases, 
and (2) these periods can be interpreted using the business cycles defined by Japan’s Cabinet Office. 
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Figure 1: Stock log-returns and sentiment index around the Plaza Accord (September 22, 1985), 
shown by red solid and blue dashed lines, respectively. The latter is plotted six days in advance. 
 
 
Figure 2: Stock log-returns and sentiment index around the highest peak of Nikkei 225 
(December 29, 1989), shown by red solid and blue dashed lines, respectively. The latter is 




Figure 3: Stock log-returns and sentiment index around the climax of the Internet Bubble 
(April 12, 2000) shown by red solid and blue dashed lines, respectively. The latter is plotted six 
days in advance. 
 
 
Figure 4: Stock log-returns and sentiment index around the Great East Japan Earthquake 
(March 11, 2011), shown by red solid and blue dashed lines, respectively. The latter is plotted 










# Headlines # Words Mean Stdev Max Min Mean Stdev Max Min
1984 230 65,726 183,769 0.0876 0.0148 0.1711 0.0500 ‐234 73 ‐26 ‐354
1985 285 88,177 240,997 0.0832 0.0135 0.1353 0.0145 ‐257 79 ‐24 ‐400
1986 279 111,341 281,921 0.0830 0.0124 0.1332 0.0528 ‐300 87 ‐24 ‐449
1987 274 144,420 348,966 0.0869 0.0123 0.1772 0.0550 ‐364 85 ‐56 ‐518
1988 273 147,246 357,073 0.0918 0.0118 0.1617 0.0629 ‐366 85 ‐58 ‐500
1989 249 160,890 381,651 0.0912 0.0136 0.1667 0.0563 ‐395 91 ‐77 ‐546
1990 246 169,788 406,462 0.0918 0.0144 0.1790 0.0630 ‐419 93 ‐73 ‐578
1991 246 176,807 427,366 0.0901 0.0130 0.1595 0.0548 ‐442 102 ‐69 ‐639
1992 247 172,317 429,971 0.0867 0.0115 0.1419 0.0637 ‐451 109 ‐80 ‐606
1993 246 170,922 422,787 0.0863 0.0128 0.1814 0.0641 ‐447 112 ‐86 ‐594
1994 247 170,194 423,289 0.0858 0.0105 0.1311 0.0600 ‐458 111 ‐97 ‐638
1995 249 176,302 437,018 0.0864 0.0111 0.1494 0.0552 ‐476 115 ‐99 ‐724
1996 247 181,199 443,118 0.0882 0.0133 0.2196 0.0625 ‐475 117 ‐91 ‐685
1997 245 180,477 449,381 0.0859 0.0106 0.1204 0.0589 ‐485 121 ‐99 ‐686
1998 247 182,539 458,607 0.0876 0.0113 0.1574 0.0627 ‐494 121 ‐97 ‐665
1999 245 177,713 458,276 0.0895 0.0101 0.1344 0.0680 ‐482 120 ‐96 ‐642
2000 248 179,270 457,163 0.0894 0.0141 0.2304 0.0545 ‐490 122 ‐102 ‐642
2001 246 172,078 449,533 0.0861 0.0117 0.1972 0.0643 ‐497 123 ‐99 ‐703
2002 246 169,966 426,710 0.0837 0.0101 0.1302 0.0498 ‐467 111 ‐110 ‐612
2003 245 172,756 433,157 0.0880 0.0123 0.1564 0.0543 ‐466 110 ‐102 ‐616
2004 246 178,129 444,992 0.0902 0.0112 0.1757 0.0615 ‐470 117 ‐123 ‐629
2005 245 184,827 463,459 0.0913 0.0126 0.1462 0.0464 ‐489 122 ‐116 ‐648
2006 248 188,322 472,318 0.0897 0.0106 0.1163 0.0426 ‐503 119 ‐127 ‐664
2007 245 186,054 470,880 0.0942 0.0125 0.1861 0.0557 ‐497 124 ‐120 ‐665
2008 245 187,137 476,570 0.0896 0.0101 0.1191 0.0601 ‐510 134 ‐131 ‐680
2009 243 180,747 467,410 0.0945 0.0122 0.1419 0.0631 ‐492 130 ‐106 ‐669
2010 245 173,716 446,999 0.0965 0.0122 0.1364 0.0560 ‐466 118 ‐99 ‐630
2011 245 168,901 436,051 0.0926 0.0120 0.1481 0.0553 ‐454 116 ‐101 ‐639
2012 186 129,981 323,518 0.0943 0.0107 0.1220 0.0605 ‐450 105 ‐99 ‐611
Total 7,188 4,747,942 11,919,412











# Articles # Words Mean Stdev Max Min Mean Stdev Max Min
1984 230 65,726 2,323,610 0.1152 0.0086 0.1528 0.0947 ‐4,915 1,211 ‐603 ‐6,653
1985 285 88,177 2,905,806 0.1122 0.0078 0.1364 0.0945 ‐5,017 1,253 ‐619 ‐6,678
1986 279 111,341 3,305,971 0.1093 0.0087 0.1601 0.0927 ‐5,457 1,273 ‐531 ‐7,765
1987 274 144,420 4,100,562 0.1096 0.0071 0.1440 0.0885 ‐6,546 1,225 ‐1,202 ‐9,545
1988 273 147,246 4,163,680 0.1123 0.0065 0.1352 0.0955 ‐6,614 1,250 ‐1,328 ‐9,064
1989 249 160,890 4,541,870 0.1126 0.0073 0.1498 0.0908 ‐7,160 1,308 ‐1,455 ‐9,646
1990 246 169,788 4,834,260 0.1117 0.0074 0.1401 0.0974 ‐7,623 1,385 ‐1,758 ‐10,430
1991 246 176,807 5,017,746 0.1100 0.0074 0.1433 0.0947 ‐7,938 1,562 ‐1,677 ‐10,670
1992 247 172,317 4,753,806 0.1071 0.0078 0.1465 0.0902 ‐7,632 1,570 ‐1,670 ‐10,240
1993 246 170,922 4,683,689 0.1071 0.0075 0.1328 0.0919 ‐7,677 1,669 ‐1,517 ‐12,190
1994 247 170,194 4,748,646 0.1073 0.0066 0.1294 0.0925 ‐7,953 1,629 ‐1,905 ‐12,670
1995 249 176,302 5,057,085 0.1076 0.0061 0.1290 0.0920 ‐8,453 1,781 ‐1,685 ‐14,310
1996 247 181,199 4,776,664 0.1062 0.0073 0.1454 0.0909 ‐7,705 1,699 ‐1,625 ‐12,310
1997 245 180,477 4,860,673 0.1055 0.0068 0.1335 0.0901 ‐7,835 1,738 ‐1,612 ‐11,510
1998 247 182,539 4,962,891 0.1066 0.0067 0.1364 0.0933 ‐7,944 1,776 ‐1,669 ‐11,890
1999 245 177,713 4,962,023 0.1086 0.0062 0.1311 0.0938 ‐7,953 1,750 ‐1,774 ‐13,070
2000 248 179,270 4,956,864 0.1081 0.0067 0.1318 0.0923 ‐8,137 1,852 ‐1,748 ‐12,670
2001 246 172,078 4,962,740 0.1056 0.0070 0.1404 0.0892 ‐8,291 1,960 ‐1,735 ‐12,930
2002 246 169,966 4,714,323 0.1053 0.0061 0.1260 0.0919 ‐7,797 1,773 ‐1,682 ‐12,330
2003 245 172,756 4,758,561 0.1096 0.0083 0.1685 0.0949 ‐7,782 1,766 ‐1,653 ‐11,500
2004 246 178,129 4,927,544 0.1103 0.0062 0.1513 0.0977 ‐7,990 1,897 ‐1,969 ‐12,030
2005 245 184,827 5,211,410 0.1128 0.0087 0.1824 0.0942 ‐8,473 2,013 ‐1,906 ‐11,880
2006 248 188,322 5,322,696 0.1110 0.0058 0.1306 0.0937 ‐8,735 1,897 ‐2,294 ‐12,340
2007 245 186,054 5,315,917 0.1148 0.0076 0.1620 0.0961 ‐8,675 1,978 ‐2,080 ‐12,010
2008 245 187,137 5,295,990 0.1112 0.0065 0.1387 0.1005 ‐8,717 2,067 ‐2,311 ‐12,210
2009 243 180,747 5,182,147 0.1158 0.0096 0.1862 0.0987 ‐8,491 2,048 ‐1,859 ‐12,250
2010 245 173,716 5,026,066 0.1155 0.0069 0.1544 0.1021 ‐8,255 1,965 ‐1,903 ‐11,440
2011 245 168,901 4,897,555 0.1109 0.0072 0.1424 0.0886 ‐8,175 1,842 ‐1,968 ‐10,600
2012 186 129,981 3,766,690 0.1141 0.0061 0.1325 0.0972 ‐8,312 1,798 ‐2,072 ‐10,900






Table 3: Augmented Dickey–Fuller tests for stock log-returns, integer- and real-valued 
headline sentiment indexes, and integer- and real-valued article sentiment indexes. *, **, and 












1984 ‐5.4880*** ‐5.0318*** ‐3.7591** ‐4.0380*** ‐3.297*
1985 ‐7.1004*** ‐5.2897*** ‐5.7496*** ‐5.2504*** ‐4.6607***
1986 ‐7.2527*** ‐5.1843*** ‐5.2708*** ‐4.9970*** ‐5.1246***
1987 ‐6.5413*** ‐5.9684*** ‐5.3246*** ‐5.5712*** ‐5.4409***
1988 ‐6.4063*** ‐5.9290*** ‐5.4239*** ‐6.1967*** ‐4.8352***
1989 ‐6.9547*** ‐5.0145*** ‐5.8790*** ‐4.5831*** ‐5.2179***
1990 ‐6.9928*** ‐5.4893*** ‐5.6240*** ‐5.3558*** ‐5.7184***
1991 ‐5.1598*** ‐5.7939*** ‐4.8037*** ‐6.3355*** ‐4.1888***
1992 ‐5.4792*** ‐6.3532*** ‐5.1348*** ‐4.6200*** ‐4.5096***
1993 ‐6.4808*** ‐6.9314*** ‐5.0504*** ‐5.1176*** ‐4.2791***
1994 ‐6.9909*** ‐6.1131*** ‐5.1849*** ‐5.2693*** ‐4.8160***
1995 ‐6.9673*** ‐6.1640*** ‐5.3160*** ‐5.2780*** ‐4.6730***
1996 ‐5.6239*** ‐6.5991*** ‐5.6797*** ‐5.6666*** ‐4.3760***
1997 ‐6.6696*** ‐5.2706*** ‐4.7062*** ‐5.4686*** ‐4.7215***
1998 ‐6.8693*** ‐6.0819*** ‐5.9142*** ‐4.6294*** ‐4.3624***
1999 ‐6.3387*** ‐6.2330*** ‐4.9845*** ‐5.3332*** ‐4.0785***
2000 ‐5.9670*** ‐5.2204*** ‐5.4203*** ‐4.5614*** ‐4.3051***
2001 ‐6.0622*** ‐5.0882*** ‐5.0572*** ‐4.5301*** ‐5.4627***
2002 ‐5.5326*** ‐5.5353*** ‐4.7518*** ‐4.9812*** ‐3.7554**
2003 ‐6.3994*** ‐5.1537*** ‐5.4731*** ‐5.1329*** ‐5.1982***
2004 ‐5.6038*** ‐5.9536*** ‐4.8208*** ‐4.7719*** ‐5.3203***
2005 ‐5.8754*** ‐4.2963*** ‐5.1393*** ‐4.7266*** ‐5.5057***
2006 ‐5.7207*** ‐6.5611*** ‐5.4300*** ‐4.9215*** ‐5.4060***
2007 ‐6.6422*** ‐4.8775*** ‐4.6821*** ‐4.6387*** ‐5.1797***
2008 ‐6.3624*** ‐5.2850*** ‐4.6569*** ‐4.0132*** ‐4.1611***
2009 ‐5.5606*** ‐3.9091** ‐5.7807*** ‐4.6055*** ‐5.7466***
2010 ‐6.4374*** ‐4.3466*** ‐5.1214*** ‐4.2901*** ‐5.4635***
2011 ‐6.4182*** ‐5.5632*** ‐5.4443*** ‐6.7019*** ‐5.2036***






Table 4: Predictability of “real-valued sentiment index” in terms of Granger tests and AICs. 
Test statistics for Granger causality are given in the columns titled “Granger.” *, **, and *** 





Lag (p) Granger AIC Lag (p) Granger AIC Lag (p) Granger H Granger A AIC
1984 3 1.29 ‐10.17 6 1.44 ‐10.10 6 4.74*** 3.94*** ‐11.19
1985 7 1.61 ‐10.46 6 1.91* ‐10.65 6 5.07*** 3.49*** ‐11.45
1986 2 2.14 ‐10.18 6 1.40 ‐10.44 6 2.12** 2.25*** ‐11.60
1987 2 0.02 ‐9.21 6 0.62 ‐9.77 6 1.12 0.78 ‐11.17
1988 2 1.04 ‐11.07 6 0.61 ‐11.38 6 4.65*** 2.21** ‐12.88
1989 2 2.60* ‐11.53 5 1.11 ‐12.01 5 4.59*** 2.10** ‐13.70
1990 2 0.16 ‐8.73 7 1.55 ‐9.63 5 4.11*** 4.04*** ‐11.21
1991 2 0.26 ‐9.37 5 0.44 ‐10.35 5 2.91*** 5.28*** ‐11.72
1992 5 1.50 ‐8.69 5 1.02 ‐9.48 5 2.76*** 2.18** ‐10.79
1993 1 1.68 ‐9.18 5 0.17 ‐10.03 5 2.67*** 3.77*** ‐11.29
1994 1 0.48 ‐9.46 5 0.42 ‐10.27 5 1.15 5.99*** ‐11.52
1995 5 0.59 ‐9.19 5 0.34 ‐9.98 5 9.07*** 8.92*** ‐11.48
1996 5 1.37 ‐10.05 5 0.75 ‐11.08 5 2.99*** 3.94*** ‐12.61
1997 2 0.09 ‐8.78 5 1.22 ‐9.72 5 2.56*** 4.93*** ‐11.21
1998 5 3.25*** ‐8.80 5 1.86 ‐9.94 5 4.06*** 5.65*** ‐11.28
1999 1 0.66 ‐9.29 5 0.36 ‐9.99 5 1.15 3.17*** ‐11.22
2000 1 4.24** ‐8.99 5 1.41 ‐10.04 6 2.22*** 7.01*** ‐11.36
2001 2 0.30 ‐8.59 1 0.39 ‐9.72 1 2.12 1.55 ‐11.17
2002 2 2.37* ‐8.90 5 1.31 ‐10.10 5 1.13 1.61* ‐11.74
2003 1 0.12 ‐8.89 5 0.25 ‐10.30 1 0.53 2.22 ‐11.99
2004 1 0.13 ‐9.50 5 1.05 ‐10.70 1 0.13 5.55*** ‐12.26
2005 5 0.28 ‐10.10 5 0.39 ‐11.24 1 5.10*** 17.16*** ‐12.81
2006 5 0.94 ‐9.37 5 1.81 ‐10.53 5 1.40 5.50*** ‐12.27
2007 6 0.39 ‐9.59 6 0.22 ‐10.70 5 2.80*** 4.96*** ‐12.32
2008 6 0.49 ‐7.68 5 0.67 ‐8.59 5 2.70*** 6.65*** ‐10.15
2009 6 0.63 ‐8.87 6 0.67 ‐9.88 6 3.71*** 2.55*** ‐11.36
2010 5 1.95* ‐9.24 5 2.18* ‐10.36 5 1.88** 5.71*** ‐12.02
2011 1 0.08 ‐9.18 5 0.80 ‐10.00 5 1.39 2.12** ‐11.44





Table 5: Predictability of “integer-valued sentiment index” in terms of Granger tests and AICs. 
Test statistics for Granger causality are given in the columns titled “Granger.” *, **, and *** 




Lag (p) Granger AIC Lag (p) Granger AIC Lag (p) Granger H Granger A AIC
1984 1 0.24 ‐9.76 1 0.96 ‐10.04 1 2.99* 4.55** ‐10.19
1985 2 2.97* ‐10.39 3 4.04*** ‐10.72 1 1.02 1.04 ‐10.83
1986 1 2.63 ‐9.62 1 2.91* ‐9.49 1 6.56*** 1.06 ‐9.79
1987 1 0.22 ‐8.40 6 1.64 ‐8.70 1 0.20 6.18*** ‐9.08
1988 2 0.74 ‐10.37 5 1.64 ‐10.77 1 0.24 2.54* ‐11.15
1989 6 1.14 ‐10.42 1 2.17 ‐10.86 1 0.40 0.96 ‐11.11
1990 2 0.09 ‐7.65 2 1.37 ‐8.16 2 0.59 1.48 ‐8.28
1991 1 0.38 ‐8.69 1 1.05 ‐9.03 2 2.97** 2.38* ‐9.39
1992 1 2.38 ‐8.28 5 0.98 ‐8.29 1 3.16** 0.62 ‐8.80
1993 4 4.37*** ‐8.81 1 0.02 ‐9.06 1 0.50 0.04 ‐9.34
1994 5 1.66 ‐9.55 1 0.02 ‐9.59 1 0.09 0.61 ‐10.31
1995 1 0.07 ‐8.86 1 0.09 ‐9.28 1 0.19 1.32 ‐9.74
1996 1 4.47** ‐9.33 1 0.10 ‐9.73 1 2.40* 0.51 ‐9.91
1997 2 1.04 ‐8.67 2 0.39 ‐8.82 2 1.33 0.67 ‐9.48
1998 2 1.16 ‐8.49 5 1.88* ‐8.78 1 2.82* 1.10 ‐9.40
1999 1 0.12 ‐9.35 1 0.05 ‐9.57 1 0.18 4.94*** ‐10.39
2000 1 0.14 ‐8.41 1 0.70 ‐9.11 1 0.26 1.07 ‐9.23
2001 1 1.75 ‐8.28 1 0.02 ‐8.48 1 1.82 1.47 ‐9.13
2002 1 0.12 ‐8.82 1 1.31 ‐9.01 1 0.03 1.51 ‐9.78
2003 5 2.50** ‐8.70 4 1.80 ‐8.63 1 5.55*** 2.36* ‐9.10
2004 1 0.01 ‐9.38 1 0.00 ‐9.69 1 3.74** 0.34 ‐10.38
2005 1 0.58 ‐9.74 5 0.34 ‐9.67 5 1.55 1.60 ‐10.13
2006 1 0.21 ‐9.24 2 0.15 ‐9.70 2 2.35* 2.79** ‐10.30
2007 1 1.64 ‐9.06 6 1.91* ‐9.27 1 2.18 1.89 ‐9.66
2008 1 0.37 ‐7.62 3 0.62 ‐7.68 1 2.26 3.93** ‐8.31
2009 3 2.01 ‐8.38 6 2.18** ‐8.02 1 5.06*** 0.84 ‐8.60
2010 3 1.13 ‐8.89 5 2.71** ‐9.22 3 4.69*** 1.44 ‐9.56
2011 1 0.05 ‐8.61 4 1.89 ‐8.95 1 1.56 2.62* ‐9.21





Table 6: Year-by-year estimates from 1984 to 2012. Parameters of Model (H&A) are estimated 
on the basis of “real-valued sentiment index.” Figures in parentheses show p-values with 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Out-of-sample predictability performance in terms of “prediction errors (%).” 
 
  
Year 10 Days 20 Days 30 Days 40 Days 10 Days 20 Days 30 Days 40 Days
1984 11.2% 15.3% 20.1% 31.4% 42.6% 46.9% 46.5% 45.5%
1985 25.6% 40.7% 58.9% 53.3% 34.1% 30.8% 36.1% 36.3%
1986 39.1% 36.5% 41.0% 46.0% 16.7% 19.5% 19.6% 18.6%
1987 19.5% 40.5% 36.6% 46.9% 22.6% 24.4% 31.7% 45.6%
1988 8.2% 9.1% 9.9% 14.9% 13.5% 13.5% 14.1% 13.9%
1989 51.4% 54.2% 51.8% 56.1% 74.9% 61.2% 53.5% 52.5%
1990 64.6% 69.0% 71.0% 78.7% 59.5% 45.1% 48.9% 48.9%
1991 5.7% 9.7% 10.4% 16.3% 42.2% 37.6% 36.9% 36.3%
1992 14.9% 14.4% 33.1% 47.2% 26.5% 29.3% 31.7% 32.8%
1993 6.1% 22.4% 28.4% 25.7% 26.9% 34.7% 34.0% 31.2%
1994 32.4% 27.1% 40.3% 49.0% 25.8% 27.3% 28.7% 29.5%
1995 38.6% 33.4% 28.0% 28.2% 18.4% 27.5% 30.9% 30.7%
1996 9.4% 9.1% 8.9% 10.2% 46.2% 41.0% 35.5% 35.6%
1997 7.1% 34.7% 35.2% 45.3% 30.9% 32.0% 73.0% 68.3%
1998 13.6% 17.7% 16.4% 17.5% 19.1% 19.7% 18.5% 20.7%
1999 15.7% 17.1% 16.1% 20.1% 49.9% 46.0% 44.7% 44.8%
2000 53.3% 52.9% 57.0% 63.6% 32.0% 36.9% 38.1% 36.1%
2001 26.3% 50.5% 50.6% 84.1% 26.4% 38.9% 38.3% 40.4%
2002 19.8% 28.1% 30.5% 53.7% 15.1% 16.6% 21.6% 23.9%
2003 23.5% 43.2% 40.6% 60.8% 23.0% 24.2% 45.0% 40.3%
2004 41.3% 40.9% 35.7% 34.5% 27.3% 32.8% 34.0% 32.4%
2005 45.2% 130.4% 126.6% 124.5% 47.6% 38.3% 32.8% 31.8%
2006 51.2% 41.5% 42.7% 42.5% 36.9% 34.3% 30.5% 30.1%
2007 45.8% 42.6% 54.2% 57.4% 54.7% 46.1% 48.3% 46.8%
2008 38.8% 52.3% 76.2% 87.8% 29.0% 30.2% 29.0% 39.5%
2009 55.5% 50.9% 57.7% 70.3% 23.9% 30.0% 27.9% 31.3%
2010 23.5% 23.3% 32.8% 45.0% 24.1% 21.9% 26.3% 25.8%
2011 39.6% 36.3% 31.1% 86.0% 27.5% 23.5% 24.7% 30.3%
2012 26.7% 62.4% 65.7% 65.7% 51.4% 56.4% 51.5% 48.4%
Ave. Overall 29.4% 38.1% 41.6% 50.4% 33.4% 33.3% 35.6% 36.1%
Ave. 84‐89 25.8% 32.7% 36.4% 41.4% 34.1% 32.7% 33.6% 35.4%
Ave. 90‐94 24.7% 28.5% 36.6% 43.4% 36.2% 34.8% 36.1% 35.7%
Ave. 95‐99 16.9% 22.4% 20.9% 24.3% 32.9% 33.2% 40.5% 40.0%
Ave. 00‐04 32.9% 43.1% 42.9% 59.3% 24.8% 29.9% 35.4% 34.6%
Ave. 05‐09 47.3% 63.5% 71.5% 76.5% 38.4% 35.8% 33.7% 35.9%




Table 8: Out-of-sample predictability performance in terms of “winners (%).” 
 
Year 10 Days 20 Days 30 Days 40 Days 10 Days 20 Days 30 Days 40 Days
1984 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 50.0% 70.0% 60.0% 63.3% 55.0%
1985 60.0% 50.0% 43.3% 42.5% 40.0% 30.0% 43.3% 45.0%
1986 70.0% 65.0% 66.7% 67.5% 30.0% 30.0% 43.3% 47.5%
1987 60.0% 65.0% 60.0% 55.0% 50.0% 40.0% 36.7% 37.5%
1988 70.0% 50.0% 46.7% 42.5% 40.0% 45.0% 50.0% 50.0%
1989 60.0% 45.0% 53.3% 50.0% 70.0% 65.0% 63.3% 65.0%
1990 90.0% 70.0% 66.7% 70.0% 70.0% 65.0% 66.7% 67.5%
1991 50.0% 40.0% 46.7% 50.0% 80.0% 75.0% 63.3% 55.0%
1992 60.0% 45.0% 40.0% 47.5% 70.0% 65.0% 66.7% 70.0%
1993 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 55.0% 70.0% 55.0% 50.0% 47.5%
1994 50.0% 70.0% 66.7% 67.5% 50.0% 60.0% 53.3% 52.5%
1995 60.0% 60.0% 50.0% 55.0% 50.0% 40.0% 46.7% 50.0%
1996 40.0% 45.0% 50.0% 45.0% 60.0% 55.0% 46.7% 52.5%
1997 70.0% 60.0% 46.7% 52.5% 60.0% 50.0% 46.7% 47.5%
1998 60.0% 50.0% 53.3% 52.5% 40.0% 55.0% 53.3% 55.0%
1999 60.0% 60.0% 50.0% 52.5% 60.0% 65.0% 60.0% 57.5%
2000 50.0% 50.0% 43.3% 42.5% 70.0% 60.0% 53.3% 55.0%
2001 40.0% 30.0% 33.3% 40.0% 50.0% 55.0% 46.7% 40.0%
2002 70.0% 60.0% 53.3% 52.5% 30.0% 35.0% 36.7% 30.0%
2003 20.0% 40.0% 50.0% 42.5% 20.0% 30.0% 36.7% 37.5%
2004 20.0% 35.0% 26.7% 37.5% 30.0% 35.0% 40.0% 40.0%
2005 70.0% 50.0% 46.7% 57.5% 40.0% 45.0% 53.3% 50.0%
2006 40.0% 45.0% 56.7% 55.0% 70.0% 65.0% 60.0% 60.0%
2007 40.0% 45.0% 40.0% 42.5% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0%
2008 50.0% 55.0% 56.7% 57.5% 40.0% 45.0% 46.7% 47.5%
2009 60.0% 65.0% 63.3% 55.0% 40.0% 45.0% 50.0% 55.0%
2010 60.0% 70.0% 60.0% 57.5% 30.0% 40.0% 43.3% 42.5%
2011 80.0% 60.0% 60.0% 55.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 37.5%
2012 70.0% 45.0% 53.3% 50.0% 50.0% 45.0% 50.0% 52.5%
Ave. Overall 56.9% 52.9% 51.1% 51.7% 51.4% 50.2% 50.3% 50.1%
Ave. 84‐89 65.0% 55.8% 53.3% 51.3% 50.0% 45.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Ave. 90‐94 60.0% 55.0% 54.0% 58.0% 68.0% 64.0% 60.0% 58.5%
Ave. 95‐99 58.0% 55.0% 50.0% 51.5% 54.0% 53.0% 50.7% 52.5%
Ave. 00‐04 40.0% 43.0% 41.3% 43.0% 40.0% 43.0% 42.7% 40.5%
Ave. 05‐09 52.0% 52.0% 52.7% 53.5% 48.0% 50.0% 52.0% 52.5%
Ave. 10‐12 70.0% 58.3% 57.8% 54.2% 46.7% 45.0% 44.4% 44.2%
1st Half 2nd Half
